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Bans on coal mining have been implemented in two tribal majority states in India's north-east frontier;
Nagaland and Meghalaya. In Nagaland the state government imposed the ban in an attempt to capture
control of coal extraction and trade, while in Meghalaya India's National Green Commission imposed the
ban over concern for the environment and labour conditions. In both cases local communities have
opposed the bans, and in some areas resumed mining under the authority of tribal councils and powerful
civil society actors. In this paper we explore the politics of coal extraction that resulted in these bans and
the response of communities and authorities. In doing so we made three main arguments that contribute
to understanding of coal and communities in frontier regions where state control is partial and the legacy
of armed conﬂict is powerful. First, in both locations the majority of the coal mining activity has been
initiated and managed by members of tribal communities rather than proﬁt-driven outsiders. Second, in
contrast to other contexts in India (notably Orissa and Jharkhand) where large state or private enterprises
seek to modify the law to enable coal extraction, in Nagaland and Meghalaya it has been communities
that resent and challenge state and national laws being applied to their lands. Third, the right to extract
coal is connected to the right of tribal communities to determine what happens on their lands.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This paper explores the relationships between coal and com-
munities in Northeast India: a political and economic frontier
sharing borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar, and
Nepal. We focus on the experiences of tribal communities engaged
in coal mining activities in Nagaland and Meghalaya, two federal
states with tribal majority populations with special constitutional
provisions. Despite being majorities in their own territorial units,
these communities are national minorities and have been engageduie-Ra),
., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
6), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016in resistance to the Indian state for over six decades—especially in
Nagaland. The politics of coal in the frontier of Northeast India
illustrate three main dynamics that complicate assumptions about
the relationships between coal and communities. First, in both
locations the majority of the coal mining activity has been initiated
and managed by members of tribal communities. Rather than
proﬁt-driven outsiders, the initiators of extraction are pre-
dominantly local and are members of communities often cast as
victims of resource extraction. Second, laws banning coal extrac-
tion have been challenged and resisted by local communities. In
contrast to other contexts where large state or private enterprises
seek to modify the law—and often break it—to enable coal ex-
traction, in this case it is local actors who resent national and state
laws being applied to their lands and jeopardizing their liveli-
hoods. Third, the right to extract coal is closely linked with theities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
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lands. For communities seeking various forms of territorial au-
tonomy, control over resource extraction is at the forefront of
political action, regardless of national and state energy policy and
priorities. These dynamics have implications for our under-
standing of the ways tribal communities are understood in relation
to coal, the relationship between territorial politics and coal ex-
traction at the sub-national level, and the efﬁcacy of national level
laws in frontier regions.2. Methodology
Research for this paper was conducted through ethnographic
ﬁeldwork by the authors in the coal areas of Nagaland (2007–
2011) and Meghalaya (2005–2008) as part of two separate but
related projects on tribal communities and extractive resources. In
each location the authors carried out in-depth interviews and
observations to establish the dynamics of local resource politics.
Coal was an integral part of these politics in both locations. In
order to best capture the phenomenal changes of the last 2 years,
we consulted updated government data, national and state laws,
and secondary literature—much of which appeared in the verna-
cular press. We situate these two cases in the broader context of
tribal and indigenous communities being forced to protect their
land and mineral resources against proﬁt-driven outsiders—
whether state or corporate (see Ballard and Banks, 2003; Kirsch,
2014; Li, 2000). In many of these instances, especially in India,
tribal communities have been completely marginalized from de-
cisions over land and resource extraction, have been poorly pro-
tected by the law, and have often experienced violence in removal
and resettlement (Baviskar, 1997; Ghosh, 2006; Kennedy and King,
2013; Oskarsson, 2013; Padel and Das, 2010; Routledge, 2003;
Suykens, 2009). As such we are driven by Dove's (2006, 191)
proposition to explore the contradictions, collaborations, and
complicity “inherent in the coevolution of science, society, and
environment”. We position the experience of tribal communities in
Nagaland and Meghalaya in contrast to these experiences in order
to unearth the far more complex and seemingly counterintuitive
politics of land and resources in territories where protective land
regimes hold ﬁrm but where the structural power of coal distorts
these regimes in dramatic, and uneven, fashion.3. The coal frontier in India
Nagaland and Meghalaya are federal states in Northeast India.
(Fig. 1) Both states are classiﬁed as ‘special category states’ and
depend on ﬁnance from Indian Government in Delhi for their
annual budget transferred directly (as much as 89%) and also de-
pend upon grants, loans and other schemes coordinated by the
Ministry for Development of the North East Region and the North
East Council. Funds released to special category states are 90%
grants and 10% loans payable over 20 years—very attractive terms
for local governments. In the last decade the states of the region
have been under pressure to raise more revenue and attract in-
vestment. Energy resources including coal, gas, uranium and hy-
dropower are targeted for investment under a number of assisted
schemes at the national level, such as the ﬂagship North East Vi-
sion 2020 policy framework released in 2008, the North East In-
dustrial Investment Promotion Policy 2007 offering generous
concessions for investors, and in the various state investment and
industrialisation policies (McDuie-Ra, 2009; 2016). Vision 2020
posits that to achieve peace and alleviate poverty in the region a
‘paradigm shift in development strategy’ is needed, centred on
harnessing the region's mineral resources—coal, gas andPlease cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
resisting mining bans. Energy Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016petroleum reserves, as well as hydro-power potential, and creating
an hospitable climate for investment, border trade, and public
investment in infrastructure (MoDONER, 2008, 18–21).
For many communities in the frontier, coal is the most acces-
sible and controllable resource, particularly given the methods of
extraction common at the local level. Of primary importance in
coal extraction at the national level is the Ministry of Coal, sepa-
rated from the Ministry of Power, Coal, and Non-Conventional
Energy Sources in 1992 and embroiled in scandals ever since, in-
cluding the infamous ‘coalgate’ wherein the Ministry was accused
of corruption in the allocation of coal blocks (Miklian and Carney,
2013). The Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act,
1957 enables the Indian Government to acquire land for coal ex-
traction through a series of stages, and its implementation has
been the source of the recent controversy. In response, the Coal
Mines (Special Provisions) Act was passed in 2015 opening coal
mining private investors from India and abroad (Ministry of Law
and Justice (India), 2015; Government of India, 2015). This has
opened India's domestic coal market to exports from places like
Australia.
In a 2015 Australian Government Report, the Ofﬁce of the Chief
Economist noted: “Although prices, coal quality and investment
have thus far limited growth in Australia's thermal coal exports to
India, these barriers are now starting fall” (Ofﬁce of the Chief
Economist, 2015, 82). Australia's exports of metallurgical coal (also
known as coking coal) have tripled between 2001 and 2014, while
thermal coal remains expensive for Indian buyers when compared
to other sources, notably Indonesia, exemplifying Anna Tsing's
famous description of the transformation from “coal-the-diggable,
coal-the-sortable, coal-the-transportable, until it eventually be-
comes coal-the-burnable…[and] rubs up against other partici-
pants in the chain: unhappy villagers, conveyor belts, contracts”
(2005: 51). The Coal Mines Act has implications for coal mining in
the Northeast frontier as the supply of imported coking coal alters
demand for similar quality coal from places like Meghalaya and
Nagaland, particularly given the difﬁculties in extracting coal in
the context of the bans discussed below. At the same time the
Indian Government has urged an increase in domestic coal pro-
duction, part of a series of reforms including easing barriers to
extraction such as environmental clearances and land acquisition
(Bedi and Tillin, 2015; Ruparelia, 2015). As of early 2016 over-
supply was being reported and stock levels at power stations had
reached a record high, making the future for metallurgical imports
uncertain (Burton, 2016). However, the coal scenario in Nagaland
and Meghalaya is vastly different to the national scenario given
that national and state governments must content with constitu-
tional provisions that guarantee tribal communities control over
land.
Tribals constitute 86.5% of the population of Nagaland and
86.1% of the population in Meghalaya—split among the Khasi and
Garo communities (Census of India, 2013). The terms ‘tribal’ and
‘tribe’ denote membership of the Scheduled Tribe category in the
Indian Constitution which grants designated communities various
constitutional guarantees ranging from territorial autonomy, fed-
eral statehood, reserved posts in state institutions and assemblies,
and recognises the authority of customary courts, councils, and
law; all vital in the politics of coal. In addition, politicians and
leaders with strong tribal and clan solidarities head the formal
political institutions in these hills states as members of regional
and national political parties. In Nagaland and Meghalaya special
constitutional provisions relating to land ownership and resource
management are a powerful counter to national level laws pro-
moting coal mining, and, conversely, seeking to ban mining in
these states in recent years following an apparent ‘green turn’ at
the national level.ities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
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The history of the Northeast is bound up in colonial resource
extraction and militarization (Baruah, 2001; Kar, 2009; Kikon,
2014). Extractive economic regimes like tea and oil set up by the
British administration transformed the landscape of this frontier
region from the mid-19th Century through the clearing of forests,
the importing of labour, and the partitioning of land into various
categories of use and habitation (Saikia, 2008; Sharma, 2009). Oil
was discovered in upper Assam near Moran, Digboi, and Makum
and the British Burmah Oil Company was given a ninety-nine year
lease on the oil ﬁelds from 1889 (Brown, 2009; ONGC, 2009). As
several authors have noted, the colonial ofﬁcials were optimistic
about the coal potential in erstwhile Assam by the mid-19th
Century, particularly as an alternative to the supply from Bengal
(Saikia, 2011). Coal was discovered in upper Assam at Makum in
1865 and at Ledo in 1882, which accelerated the development of
the tea industry as coal was used to fuel the tea processing fac-
tories (Saikia, 2005: 197–8). A railway was built between the oil
ﬁelds, coalmines, and tea plantations in Upper Assam and the
Brahmaputra River in 1885. During the same period, the colonial
authorities sought to control the opium crops in Assam by ex-
panding the cultivation of the crop and introducing manufactured
opium into the markets.
Displacement and violence characterised this periods along
with the emergence of a powerful elite involved with these lu-
crative industries (Iqbal, 2015; Liu, 2010; Saikia, 2011; Sharma,
2006). Extractive industries were presided over by Europeans with
a hierarchy of administrators, clerks, traders and migrant labourers
underneath, marginalising the local populations. These arrange-
ments had different impacts in territories that make up present
day Meghalaya and Nagaland. In Nagaland, the British adminis-
tration started coal mining in 1907. The ﬁrst coal mines started in
the Konyak areas (one of the Naga tribes) along the foothill border
of present day federal states of Assam and Nagaland. In order to
carry the coal to the Brahmaputra valley of Assam, a coal loading
station was developed at Naginimora. This brought the authorities
to the foothills and in some sense helped to deﬁne where the hills
and plains, where the tribal and non-tribal habitus, began and
ended. However extraction in the Khasi Hills was more complex
and remained subject to indigenous control of land and minerals
despite claims of the Assam Railways and Trading Company to coal
ﬁelds in the hills (Ludden, 2012: 21). As Arup Saikia notes,
Unlike the coalﬁelds in eastern Assam, rights over the coalﬁelds
in the Khasi Hills remained mostly within the community in-
stitutions. The administration negotiated directly with the
community chiefs, and petty trade grew around the coalﬁelds.
The method and mode of extraction essentially remained de-
pendent on the capacity of the Khasi villagers (Saikia, 2014, 71).
Transport out of the hills was also difﬁcult making the costs of
investing high, and when coupled with the prospects of resistance
from locals, less attractive than other sources in the frontier (see
May, 2014).
Since 1947, the northeast frontier has witnessed a series of low
intensity armed conﬂicts between the Indian Government and
armed groups demanding homelands of varying levels of auton-
omy (Baruah, 2005; Barbora, 2008). The desire for control of land,
resources, and settlement in tribal majority areas is at the forefront
of these struggles, reﬂecting histories of violence, extraction, and
state-making in forests, frontiers, and coastlines throughout Asia
(Li, 2002; Kelly and Peluso, 2015; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Van-
dergeest, 2003). In light of this history, issues of governance and
regulations of land and people, particularly in terms of extractive
economic regimes are an integral factor in the region's politics,Please cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
resisting mining bans. Energy Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016economy, and social stability. In Nagaland and Meghalaya coal
mining activities are subject to politics reﬂecting this history.4. Coal in Nagaland
Nagaland is a federal state in India sharing a border with
Myanmar and with the federal states Assam, Arunachal Pradesh
and Manipur with a population of around 2.2 million. The present
boundaries of Nagaland were created in 1963 and remain heavily
contested. The Indo-Naga ceaseﬁre in 1997 was a watershed mo-
ment signalling the end of ﬁghting between Naga insurgent
groups and the Indian Government. However, it simultaneously
led to increase in conﬂicts between different Naga armed factions
seeking legitimacy and authority over people and resources. The
external conﬂict turned internal. Following the ceaseﬁre stake
holders—including various factions of Naga insurgent groups, re-
presentatives to the Naga tribal councils, student bodies, cultural
associations and the state legislative assembly—have vied for the
right to represent the Naga past and their future; a future bound
up in coal.
Nagaland has moderate coal reserves of approximately 316.41
million tonnes and mining takes place across the districts of Mo-
kokchung, Wokha, Dimapur, Longleng, Mon, and Peren (Fig. 2)
(Government of Nagaland, 2009; 2014a, 2014b). Permission to
mine is granted through patronage networks of powerful actors
ranging from Naga politicians, non-Naga contractors, insurgent
groups, and local landowners. Mining takes place in small freehold
mines using open pits and small tunnels and most labour comes
from surrounding areas.
Over the last decade the scale of coal mining, trading, and in-
vestments in infrastructure to extract coal drew the attention of
the Nagaland Government. Concerns about environmental de-
gradation such as deforestation, pollution of village streams and
rivers, and contamination of agricultural lands began to surface.
State ofﬁcials argued that coal mining should be regulated, orga-
nized, and brought under the ambit of the state government.
These debates brought Article 371 (A) of the Constitution of India
into play.
4.1. Article 371 (A) and Nagaland coal policy
Article 371 (A) of the Constitution of India guarantees special
protection for Naga people living in Nagaland in relation to land
ownership and resources. This is a stronger guarantee of rights to
minerals beneath the soil (deeper than six feet) that the provisions
of the Sixth Schedule and various federal state acts (including
Meghalaya) that mostly protect the transfer of land for agricultural
purposes. The provision has three clauses, however the inter-
pretation of clause (1) sub section (A) is at the centre of the con-
ﬂict over coal. Sub section (A) point (iv) states that no Act of Par-
liament ‘in respect of’ the ‘ownership and transfer of land and its
resources, shall apply to the State of Nagaland unless the Legisla-
tive Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution so decides’ (Bakshi,
2014). According to this provision, Naga people—here represented
by the state legislature—have the power to decide what kinds of
activities take place on, and underneath, their lands. Article 371
(A) is paramount in coal politics. However the issue at hand is not
whether coal should be mined in the ﬁrst place—in other words
Article 371 (A) is not invoked in opposition to coal mining—rather
the issue is precisely who among the circuitous network of au-
thority and control between individuals, kin groups, village
councils, and the state government authorities has the right to
extract coal and trade it.
The major contention is the overlapping jurisdiction of tradi-
tional customary law and the state government bodies like theities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
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visible in the manner permissions for coal-mining activities have
been granted in Nagaland since 2006. The Nagaland Coal Policy of
2006 empowered the Directorate of Geology and Mining to control
coal mining through prospecting and extraction licences and lea-
ses. However, tribal councils deliberate on everyday matters of
coal mining as part of their role arbitrating land and natural re-
source matters as per customary law, bypassing state policies.
In 2011, Chief Minister of Nagaland Neiphiu Rio issued a press
statement reinterpreting Article 371 (A) in the light of the debates
around resource extraction, including coal. Neiphiu highlighted
how Nagaland was blessed with huge deposits of mineral re-
sources (Morung Express, 2011). If these mineral resources were
‘exploited and utilized’, both the state of Nagaland and the Naga
people would enjoy economic prosperity. He added that Article
371 (A) was a special constitutional safeguard for the preservation
and protection of the ‘Naga way of life’. He acknowledged the
ownership of land and its resources by the people of Nagaland, but
stated that it was up to the state government ‘to frame laws and
regulations and to work out the modalities for exploration and
exploitation of our mineral resources’.
In 2014, the Nagaland Government amended the 2006 Coal
Policy banning coal-mining activities with effect from the month
of October. The state ban on coal mining activities would be im-
posed until the state set up its own structures comprising of the
Nagaland Coal Controlling and Trading System and Integrated Coal
Depots. According to the 2014 amendment, the state government
would directly broker coal deals with private companies and
agencies and declare the contracts and activities of local coal tra-
ders and landowners as null and void. Further, other than the
designated government coal depots, all other private coal depots
in Nagaland would be declared as illegal. In a dramatic grab for
power over resources, the state government used their inter-
pretation of Article 371 (A) to subsume control of coal mining
across Nagaland. Perhaps most signiﬁcantly for a population worn
down by decades of violence, the 2014 amendment states that the
state government will impose these changes by deploying security
forces to the coal mining areas, coal depots, and increasing the
number of check gates to enforce the new rules and regulations. In
short, the coal mining areas and villages were to become militar-
ized to prevent communities and individuals mining without
approval.
4.2. Resisting the coal ban
Both the 2006 and 2014 coal policies are very unpopular in coal
mining areas of Nagaland. Some of the most vocal protests against
the ban on coal mining have come from the foothill villages in
Mokokchung and Mon districts. During ﬁeldwork in these villages
between 2007 and 2011, residents shared their anxieties about the
state's actions to ban coalmining activities. Lima, a female coal
trader in a foothill village, described why residents oppose the
ban:
I told the minister, you have come to this village for this ﬁrst
time and then order us to stop coal mining…you are coming to
stop what is being produced from our own farm – the coal is
coming out from our own land. It is not your land, it is our land
and we will not allow you to ban it.
Such exchanges between residents in coal mining villages and
the state government are typical.
Militarization, violence and poverty have produced an uneven
and dysfunctional economy—especially in rural areas—char-
acterised by poor employment prospects and state neglect (Kikon,
2010). In Mon, the absence of basic amenities and medical andPlease cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
resisting mining bans. Energy Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016education facilities is conspicuous. Many of the villages are in-
accessible due to absence of roads and bridges. Under such cir-
cumstances, villagers are migrating from remote villages to coal
areas in Mon and other districts. Coal extraction in Naga villages is
risky. At the village level there are reports of deaths inside the
open cast coalmines but these accidents are often unreported
more widely lest they trigger state intervention. Poor villagers
from the local area make up the majority of the workforce, unlike
the situation in Meghalaya discussed below where the workforce
is mostly migrants. Some of them own small patches of farmland
that are not sufﬁcient to feed the household, while others are
landless (Kikon, 2014). In Mon district, one of the largest coal
mining areas in Nagaland, several families have stopped growing
food and converted their ﬁelds into coal mines or potential sites to
explore for coal. Often this means leasing out their small cultivable
lands to private companies who have the ﬁnancial means to start
exploratory works. Thus thousands of locals are dependent on the
coal trade for their livelihood. From their perspective the ban on
coal mining is tantamount to losing control of mineral resources
on their community lands.
However, resistance to the coal ban has not been uniform. In
February 2014, the Konyak Students Union—a powerful civil so-
ciety actor in the Mon District—welcomed the initiative. Reiter-
ating the position of the Nagaland Government, the Konyak Stu-
dents Union decried the environmental damage that private coal
traders have caused to the village lands (Shillong Times, 2014a).
However in October the same year, the Konyak Students Union
reversed their stance declared that the Konyak villages in Mon
District would continue mining coal. This decision, according to
the press statement, was jointly taken together with the land-
owners, traders, and village councils. Villagers in Mon stated that
they would continue the coal mining activities following a ‘legal
and systemic approach’ (Eastern Mirror, 2014). Accordingly, the
traditional village councils declared they would resume providing
No Objection Certiﬁcates—effectively granting permission to mine
—provided applicants provide proper veriﬁcation.
The turn of events here is insightful. The ban was upheld in
Mon for 8 months. Yet after pressure from powerful non-state
actors including the Konyak Students Union and an alliance of
landowners, traders, and traditional councils decided to resume
coal mining. The extraction of coal depends not only on the ex-
istence of energy policy at the national and/or state levels but on
the way powerful local actors interpret legal and illegal mining
operations and core constitutional mechanisms. The matter at
hand is not solely about extractive economies like coal, but a larger
issue about collective ownership of land and the control of
resources.5. Coal in Meghalaya
Meghalaya is a small state bordering Bangladesh and the Indian
state of Assam with a population of around two million people. It
was created in 1972 out of the larger state of Assam to provide a
‘homeland’ to the hill-dwelling Scheduled Tribes, though, by the
time it came into existence, it was limited to Khasi and Garo
communities as other Scheduled Tribes opted to carve out their
own states (Mathur, 1982). The Meghalaya Transfer of Land (Reg-
ulation) Act, 1971 prevents land being transferred to non-tribal
people, while the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution (as in
most other tribal areas in the Northeast) gives authority in matters
of land to traditional institutions of governance at the district and
village level (Nongbri, 1999). However, under the Sixth Schedule
the Indian state can still make claims on minerals beneath the
surface (more than six feet). The Meghalaya Land Transfer Act does
not prevent this either, nor does an amendments to the Act passedities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
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the context of the ban, the Indian Government believes it has the
right to prevent—in this case—tribal communities from mining
under the Sixth Schedule. In comparison to Nagaland, Meghalaya
has not been engaged in long-running armed insurgency against
the Indian state, despite sporadic outbreaks of anti-India violence
(Haokip, 2014; Karlsson, 2011).
Tensions and occasional violence between tribal communities
is a feature of life in different parts of the state at different periods.
Violence against non-tribal migrants (and non-tribal residents
born in the state) has been a feature of political life since the late
1970s. The long land border with Bangladesh is also a source of
anxiety for communities concerned with land and the cultural
resilience of relatively small Khasi and Garo communities. The
fencing of the entire India-Bangladesh border was supported by
various groups in Meghalaya but opposed by others—suggesting a
complex and nuanced politics around land, mobility, and access to
markets (McDuie-Ra, 2014).
5.1. Coal boom and consequences
Coal mining has been taking place in the erstwhile Khasi Hills
(now the eastern part of Meghalaya) since the 1840s, but pro-
duction only reached signiﬁcant levels in the 1980s and has been
accelerating ever since (Vakkayil and Canato, 2015).
The Meghalaya Government estimates present day coal re-
serves of 576.48 million tonnes, though only 133.13 million tonnes
are classiﬁed as ‘proved’ (Fig. 3). The coal boom in Meghalaya has
seen annual production rise from 39,000 tonnes in 1979 to 5 mil-
lion tonnes in 2014 (Government of Meghalaya, 2015 n.d). The
majority is sub-bituminous with medium to high sulphur content.
Most mines are small but widespread. Known as ‘rat-hole’
mines, pits are dug down from the surface to reach the coal and
tunnels are dug in from the sides. These mines are spread
throughout Meghalaya, but are most heavily concentrated in the
Jaintia Hills—home of the notorious Lad Rymbai mining area (of-
ten featured in media stories condemning coal mining), the Khatar
Shnong area in the East Khasi Hills, around Baghamara in the
South Garo Hills, and the area around Nongjri in the West Khasi
Hills. As the mining takes place on Sixth Schedule land, the ma-
jority of coalmine owners are tribals, and the landowners are free
to grant leases under their own terms and conditions for coal
mining (McDuie-Ra, 2007).
The boom has had a major impact on land, livelihoods, and
wealth inequalities. Families who own land where coal has been
mined and those able to use tribal council to claim title or lease on
land in these coal rich areas have become very wealthy, exacer-
bating the divisions between rich and poor, between those who
own land and those who do not. Talk of a ‘coal maﬁa’ in Meghalaya
is rife, and usually refers to the nexus of politicians, armed militant
groups, leaders in tribal councils, and ﬁnanciers who proﬁt from
coal and bend the various layers of the law to accommodate
mining. The boom on coal proﬁts has encouraged armed extortion
in the coal areas and ‘taxing’ of coal being transported through the
state and into neighbouring states. As Bengt Karlsson notes (2011,
208–14) coal mining in Meghalaya operates as a ‘shadow’ econo-
my, wherein tribal councils, traders associations, armed extor-
tionists and insurgents, various tiers of government, border se-
curity forces (in the case of exports to Bangladesh) and even weigh
bridge and toll gate operators have long operated with legal im-
punity—that is, until the 2014 ban.
The landscape of the mining areas has been transformed. Pa-
latial houses stand next to corrugated iron shacks of mine workers.
The land along the hilltops is like a lunar landscape; rubble-strewn
holes and abandoned wooden trolleys mark the entrances to the
old mines. Many of the mines are no longer economically viable asPlease cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
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like Khatar Shnong landslides have increased as the mines have
been dug deeper into the hillsides, soil erosion has increased as
the structure of the soil is undermined by the clearance of vege-
tation and the number of mines being dug, piles of coal dust and
other debris from mining operations are carried by wind and rain
into ﬁelds damaging soil and crops, and much of the land that has
been mined and abandoned is marked by craters and is thus un-
able to be cultivated. Mining has a major impact on rivers and
watercourses. Despite high monsoonal rainfall in Meghalaya, wa-
ter retention is difﬁcult due to the steep topography and denuded
hills. The watercourses that ﬂow through the valleys are vital for
the supply of water to villages for cooking, washing, and farming,
but coal mining has polluted many of the main watercourses
running through rural areas. Thus it is important to point out that
the environmental consequences of coal mining have been ex-
tremely negative.
For most of the boom period, these impacts rarely initiated
political action, with the exception of moral anxieties about
prostitution and drug use in mining areas (McDuie-Ra, 2007). As in
Nagaland the nexus between those enriched by mining, state
government ofﬁcials, and holders of traditional authority meant
opposition to coal mining was minimal (see Karlsson, 2011).
However things began to change in the late 2000s and early 2010s.
Concern from NGOs over labour practices in the mines, especially
child labour—which was reported through international media
outlets (see Miller, 2015), and from tribal organisations over the
growing presence of non-tribal migrants from outside Meghalaya
and even outside India (especially Bangladesh and Nepal) in the
mining areas and the frontier settlements surrounding them, be-
gan to bring more internal scrutiny to coal mining (NESRC, 2013).
As in Nagaland, the conditions in the mines are dangerous.
During ﬁeldwork in the mining areas the conditions for labourers
present a further dimension to the social impacts of coal, though
one predominantly affecting migrants with few prospects of po-
litical participation or representation. The mining is done in low
and narrow shafts often kilometres below the surface. Miners
suffer from the effects of poor ventilation, silicosis from coal dust
inhalation, all kinds of bodily complaints, and the risk of mine
collapse. Most of those working on the coal mines live in shanty-
towns or camps at the mine sites with no sanitation, poor shelters
that cannot sustain the volume of rain in the wet season, and are
captive to merchants selling food and water—especially at the
remote sites.
Migrant labour was tolerated in the early years of the boom, yet
from the late 2000s as more and more migrants arrived in the
Meghalaya coal ﬁelds—driven by a range of factors as diverse as
the end of civil conﬂict in Nepal and the need for former ﬁghters to
ﬁnd livelihoods, the Global Financial Crisis reducing remittances
from family members working abroad, political turmoil in Ban-
gladesh, and the acceleration of conﬂicts in nearby parts of the
Northeast such as the Bodo areas of Assam—local opposition grew.
The main focus of opposition has been on Nepali-speaking migrant
miners (some from Nepal and some from other parts of India) who
are accused of taking jobs from locals in the mines and threatening
tribal land and culture (Wagle, 2010); a charge that has a long
history in the expulsion of Nepalis from Meghalaya in the 1970s
and 1980s. Opposition to Nepali-speaking migrants culminated in
2010 in a violent episode at Lampi (Langpih) village—a disputed
area on the border between Meghalaya and neighbouring Assam,
where Nepali-speaking migrants, many of whom are mine-work-
ers, are accused of settling and thus boosting Assam's claim to the
territory. The incident began with the assault of a Nepali-speaker
and resulted in the shooting of four Khasi (tribal) villages by the
Assam State Police and the formation of a high-level government
inquiry (The Justice PC Phukan Inquiry Commission). Whileities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
/j.enpol.2016.05.021i
D. McDuie-Ra, D. Kikon / Energy Policy ∎ (∎∎∎∎) ∎∎∎–∎∎∎6seemingly unrelated to coal mining, the Lampi incident heighted
general opposition to Nepali-speakers settling in Meghalaya. In
2013 8 migrant coal workers were killed in the South Garo Hills,
promoting several thousand to ﬂee the area (The Hindu, 2013).
Estimates on the number of migrant workers in the coal mining
areas of Meghalaya range from 150,000 to 35,000 (Madhavan,
2005; The Hindu, 2013). Accurate numbers are very difﬁcult to
obtain given some migrants come from outside India, some from
within, and movement between Nepal and India is not monitored
under the 1950 India-Nepal Friendship Treaty. Furthermore mine
owner and operators seek to disguise the number of migrant la-
bourers fearing crackdowns by ethno-nationalist groups and anti-
migration organisations. However not all labour in the mining
areas comes from migrants. In the mines around Nongjri in the
West Khasi Hills for example, Nepalis, Bodos (a tribal community
from Assam), Bengalis, and a large number of tribals from the Ri
Bhoi district in Meghalaya live and work in the mine site. Landless
labourers from nearby villages also work in the mines from time to
time, but many cultivate crops as well. Yet opposition to coal
mining within Meghalaya comes not from the environmental
impacts but from concern over number of migrant workers and
the perceived threat they pose to livelihoods, territory, and culture
of tribal communities.
5.2. Coal ban
If opposition to coal within Meghalaya has been focused on the
labour force, opposition from outside the state was driven by en-
vironmental concerns. In April 2014 the National Green Tribunal
(NGT), established under a 2010 Act of Parliament to fast track
‘environmental justice’ issues outside the Code of Civil Procedure
(National Green Tribunal, 2015; NGT, n.d.), ordered the Meghalaya
Government to ban illegal ‘rat-hole’ coal mining and illegal trans-
portation of mined coal in the state. The ban was heavily inﬂuenced
by a report by two local academics outlining the environmental
impacts of ‘rat-hole’ mining (Swer and Singh, 2004) and petitions
submitted by a number of student unions from adjacent territories
in Assam through which coal is transported and has polluted wa-
tercourses and landscapes more generally. The interim ban was
upheld in early 2015. The police have acted on behalf of the NGT to
monitor mine activity and the NGT has even made demands on the
Meghalaya Government to reveal the identities of deviant mine
owners (Shillong Times, 2015a, 2015b; 2016a; 2016b).
The Meghalaya Government has opposed the coal ban ap-
pealing to the NGT to lift it citing the massive losses of revenue
and the impact on livelihoods. The Chief Minister of Meghalaya
Mukul Sangma estimated losses of 600 crore rupees (US$92 mil-
lion). Sangma's claim is difﬁcult to support with data given that
the ban has not yet been in place for a full ﬁnancial year (April to
March), making conventional indicators limited in demonstrating
a slow down in either production of exports. However, there has
certainly been anxiety over the ban in locations reliant on Me-
ghalaya coal, especially Bangladesh. Exports to Bangladesh from
Meghalaya are estimated at between 1.6 and 2.1 million tonnes
annually, 80% of which is believed to power brick kilns (Islam,
2014). However, given the volume of coal illegally traded and
transported, such statistics can be limited in their value. None-
theless, a series of meetings between local politicians from both
sides of the border have taken place and pressure has been applied
to lift the ban. The NGT allowed exports to Bangladesh for a four-
month period in 2015, but only already extracted coal was per-
missible for transport (Anik, 2015).
A range of political parties and civil society organisations have
also opposed the ban, including the recently formed Movement for
Indigenous Peoples' Rights and Livelihood-Meghalaya (MIPRL)
which invoked the Sixth Schedule in their opposition to the ban. InPlease cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
resisting mining bans. Energy Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016particular they, and others, cite Paragraph 12 A which protects
tribal rights over land and land use (Shillong Times, 2014b). Coal
smuggling is allegedly rife following the ban and the local media
carries regular reports of coal smugglers being apprehended by
various security forces, particularly when attempting to smuggle
coal into Bangladesh—the primary market for Meghalaya coal
(Khan, 2014).
Unlike in Nagaland where the state government imposed the
ban in an attempt to exert control over coal mining, the Meghalaya
Government is in a difﬁcult position of having a ban imposed from
a national body and having to contend with the fallout locally. Coal
is woven into the political power structure in the state that in-
cludes state and non-state actors. As one journalist put it when
reporting on the impact of the ban, ‘every aspect of life in Me-
ghalaya, including politics, is linked to the coal trade’ (Siddiqi,
2015). Indeed the Chief Minister of Meghalaya has declared several
landholdings that contain coalmines and his children also own
mines in parts of the state (Siddiqi, 2015). There is an additional
issue at play; the Meghalaya Government has passed its own
mining laws under The Meghalaya Mines and Mineral Policy
(2012) which adhere to the principle of customary land use and
tribal control of land in the state regardless of whether they
contravene elements of national coal laws and policy. The Me-
ghalaya policy does not discuss rat-hole mining, framed as a ‘tra-
ditional’ form of mining that is beyond state intervention, stating
in clause 7.6 that ‘small and traditional system of mining by local
people in their own land shall not be unnecessarily disturbed’
(Government of Meghalaya, 2012: 392). The NGT has challenged
the Meghalaya Mines and Mineral Policy and requested a revised
version by late 2015 (Shillong Times, 2015a, 2015b). Like the Na-
galand Government the Meghalaya Government seeks to control
coal mining in the state, yet the Meghalaya Government wants to
avoid tensions with tribal councils. It is the restrictions imposed by
a national body preventing the Meghalaya Government taking
control of coal mining, opposition ‘from above’ as it were, rather
than opposition from below as in Nagaland.
Common to both cases is the right of tribal communities to
control land through customary measures is considered inviolable
in the formation of policy and laws around coal and other mining,
regardless of the kinds of practices and impacts mining has on
communities and the ways in which intra-tribal differences in
wealth, power, and inﬂuence shape the ways energy policy is
formulated, enacted, and navigated.6. Conclusion
Nagaland and Meghalaya present two complex cases of re-
lationships between coal and communities in border regions of
Asia. There are key differences between the cases. In Nagaland the
desire for absolute sovereignty shapes and is shaped by the politics
of land and coal as does the unique genesis and status of Article
371(A).
In Meghalaya the desire for control over land and the right to
continue mining coal is subject to a different legal framework
wherein the state can claim minerals beneath the soil, while
communities use the argument about control of land to continue
mining. In both cases the ﬁght for tribal control over land has been
hard-fought, and in the case of Nagaland in particular, punctuated
by violence, trauma and loss.
Coal mining exacerbates the tensions over who has the right to
regulate and govern the ways land in used; which in turn become
proxy debates for who has the right to represent tribal commu-
nities. In both cases coal mining has been initiated and managed
by tribal communities rather than proﬁt-driven outsiders intent on
exploiting indigenous lands. Indeed outsider authorities have hadities and coal in Northeast India: The politics of imposing and
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couraging it, especially in Meghalaya.
Yet in both cases elite control—alongside the creation of a ‘new’
coal elite—from within tribal communities is a signiﬁcant feature of
indigenous control of mineral resources and land. Bans on coal
mining and transport—in the case of Nagaland initiated by the state
government and in the case of Meghalaya by a national level body—
have been challenged and resisted in both locations on the grounds
of preserving tribal autonomy and the resources underneath it.
Despite the Northeast borderland being imagined as a storehouse of
energy and resource wealth, national mining and energy policies are
fervently contested and disregarded on the ground, while state po-
licies seek to reinforce local control—though the beneﬁciaries of that
control varies in each case. Research on coal and communities—
especially when involving indigenous, tribal, and other ethnic min-
ority groups—often narrates a battle between big capital—whether
state or private—and small communities intent on environmental
preservation. In both Nagaland and Meghalaya tribal communities
and their elected and non-elected representatives—many of who
beneﬁt directly from coal proﬁts or are beholden to those who do,
defend coal mining and subvert bans. While this in itself is an im-
portant issue to contend with in research on coal and communities,
care must also be taken to identify the ways coal is bound up in
larger question of territory, identity, and representation.
Furthermore, research seeking out the voices of those nega-
tively impacted by coal mining and their agency—or lack of it—isMap 1.0. The states of Northeast India. Court
Please cite this article as: McDuie-Ra, D., Kikon, D., Tribal commun
resisting mining bans. Energy Policy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016necessary in discovering the ﬁssures within tribal communities
exacerbated by coal mining. As both cases demonstrate, coal em-
powers existing elites in new ways while also bringing other ac-
tors—armed groups, traders associations, local politicians, tribal
councils, into the nexus.
From a policy perspective the informal exploitation of coal, under
tribal authority, has created a ‘new coal elite’, a bloc empowered by
the local and national state's tribal provisions. This coal elite presides
over an impoverished (often migrant) labour force, along with in-
creasingly degraded lands and polluted waterways. The imposition of
coal bans from the national level transforms this socio-environmental
issue into an issue of cultural autonomy, which in the cases above has
backﬁred, and coal has become mired in an increasingly complex
battle over intra-tribal resource control. The national level policy of a
ban could be rethought, and autonomy for local communities in coal
areas given safeguards to ensure those bearing the costs of the coal
boom, especially downstream, and the workers in the mines, are
empowered and protected rather than simply punished.Acknowledgement
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